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LIQUIDITY CONTRACTIONS, INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION
AND THE PREVALENCE OF NEGATIVE EQUITY NON-RECOURSE LOANS
MIGUEL A. IRAOLA AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
Abstract. We address a dynamic general equilibrium model where securities are backed by
collateralized loans, and borrowers face endogenous liquidity contractions and financial participa-
tion constraints. Although the only payment enforcement is the seizure of collateral guarantees,
restrictions on credit access make individually optimal payment strategies—coupon payment, pre-
payment, and default—sensitive to idiosyncratic factors. In particular, the lack of liquidity and
the presence of financial participation constraints rationalize the prevalence of negative equity
loans. We prove equilibrium existence, characterize optimal payment strategies, and provide a
numerical example illustrating our main results.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis 2007-2009 was preceded by an intense rise in the volume of securitized
debt (see Figure I). This process and the complexity of securitization operations fostered the origina-
tion of subprime mortgages, increasing the fragility of the financial system. Indeed, the fall of house
prices in 2006 reduced home equity and increased delinquency rates (shown in Figure II), starting
the financial crisis. The devastating economic effects of these events emphasize the relevance of
understanding investors’ optimal strategies in asset-backed security markets.
This paper presents a general equilibrium model which captures the three most relevant risk
factors underlying asset-backed security markets: credit risk, prepayment risk, and interest rate
risk. Despite their importance, these risks have been partially incorporated in general equilibrium
models, making it difficult to understand the interdependence of optimal decisions and asset prices
in securitized debt markets. Additionally, in our model the presence of restrictions to credit access
makes individually optimal payment strategies (i.e., coupon payment, prepayment, and default)
sensitive to idiosyncratic factors. This property seems to be crucial in a theoretical analysis of
collateralized asset markets. As emphasized by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000), idiosyncratic
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components are essential to estimate default and prepayment risks. Moreover, liquidity contractions
and financial participation constraints have also been considered as fundamental ingredients to re-
produce some empirical asset pricing moments (see Guvenen (2009)), and to analyze the impact of
the FED’s Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) (see Chen, Cu´rdia and Ferrero (2011) and Gertler
and Karadi (2012)).
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Figure I: Total Securitized Debt over GPD in the Unites States.
Source: Flow of Funds account of the United States (Tables L.122-124).1
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Figure II: New Delinquent Balances by Loan Type
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel .2
1Sum of Government Sponsored Enterprises, Agency and GSE-Backed Mortgage Pools, and ABS Issuers.
2MORTGAGE: Mortgage loans. HELOC: Home Equity Lines of Credit. AUTO: Auto loans. CC: Credit Card
Loans. OTHER: Consumer finance and retail loans.
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We consider a general equilibrium model with non-recourse collateralized loans, prepayment risk,
liquidity contractions and incomplete financial participation. In particular, Geanakoplos and Zame
(1997, 2002, 2007) general equilibrium model of collateralized debt is extended to a three-period
setting with long-lived securities.3 We show that, in contrast to the previous literature on incom-
plete financial participation, equilibrium exists without requiring financial survival assumptions or
impatience conditions on preferences (cf. Aouani and Cornet (2011), Cornet and Gopalan (2010),
Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011)).
In our model, credit contracts are collateralized by durable goods, and the only payment enforce-
ment is the seizure of these guarantees.4 Each credit contract is characterized by its emission node,
coupon payments, prepayment rule, and collateral requirements. After the emission of a credit line,
borrowers have the possibility to pay the coupon or close short positions by either delivering the col-
lateral or prepaying. Furthermore, the set of available credit instruments varies exogenously across
states and depends on agents’ identity, while the set of available investment opportunities varies
endogenously as a consequence of individual default and prepayment decisions. Hence, financial
markets could become more incomplete as a consequence of individually optimal actions.
Interest rate risk is captured by price-dependent coupon payments. Both coupon payments and
prepayment rules are just required to be continuous functions of prices and hence, a wide vari-
ety of specifications are possible. We show that our model could incorporate debt contracts with
exogenously specified interest rates, and forward and backward looking prepayment rules. Further-
more, liquidity contractions and exogenous financial participation constraints allow for differentiated
optimal payment schemes across agents and, therefore, credit risk depends on idiosyncratic charac-
teristics. That is, in our model the possible lack of liquidity or the existence of exogenous financial
participation constraints could make debtors more willing to pay coupons. For instance, borrowers
may decide to honor coupons associated with negative equity mortgages—debts with a lower col-
lateral value than the associated prepayment cost. This behavior cannot be rationalized in a model
3The model of Geanakoplos and Zame (1997, 2002, 2007) has previously been extended by Araujo, Pa´scoa and
Torres-Mart´ınez (2005, 2011) to an infinite-horizon economy with long-lived securities and sequential trading. The
authors show that exogenous debt limits or transversality conditions are not needed to prove equilibrium existence (cf.,
Magill and Quinzii (1994, 1996), Herna´ndez and Santos (1996), Levine and Zame (1996), Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-
Mart´ınez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003)). A major divergence of our model with respect to Araujo, Pa´scoa
and Torres-Mart´ınez (2005, 2011) is the incorporation of liquidity contractions and incomplete financial participation,
which are crucial frictions to capture heterogeneous optimal payment strategies.
4Different payment enforcement mechanisms have been considered in the literature of general equilibrium address-
ing credit risk. The effect of utility penalties on payment behavior has been analyzed by Dubey, Geanakoplos and
Shubik (1989, 2005), and Zame (1993); participation constraints have been considered by Kehoe and Levine (1993),
Kocherlakota (1996), and Alvarez and Jermann (2000); bankruptcy mechanisms have been considered by Araujo and
Pa´scoa (2002), Sabarwal (2003), and Poblete-Cazenave and Torres-Mart´ınez (2012).
4 M. A. Iraola and J. P. Torres-Mart´ınez
without credit tightening—as in Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez (2005, 2011)—since borrowers
optimally decide to default on negative equity loans.
The prevalence of negative equity non-recourse loans is an empirically observed pattern in a
significant portion of mortgage loans in the United States. Indeed, most borrowers with negative
equity mortgages (84.8% at the end of the first quarter in 2012) are honoring their commitments.
In the second quarter of 2012 over 22% (around 10.8 million) of mortgage loans were in negative
equity,5 a figure that hovers around 23% since the third quarter of 2009. Additionally, although
there are significant differences in the share of negative equity loans across states, it is particularly
relevant that in some non-recourse states, as Arizona and California, the share of mortgage loans in
negative equity is substantially above the aggregate mean (see Figure III below).6
Q3 2012 Equity Share 
 
Figure III: Percentage of Mortgages in Negative Equity (2012-Q2)
Source: CoreLogic, www.corelogic.com.7
Our equilibrium analysis of individually optimal payment strategies reveals that, some agents who
are borrowing constrained could optimally decide to continue paying negative equity loans. However,
the existence of more attractive credit opportunities—in terms of downpayment and interest rates—
may trigger agents’ decision to close debts. Hence, agents could optimally decide to maintain
underwater loans as a response to liquidity contractions. These result reveals a novel chanel which
rationalizes the persistence of negative equity non-recourse mortgages in the absence of additional
payment enforcements. Indeed, the existence of a high proportion of negative equity mortgages in
5According to CoreLogic data: http://www.corelogic.com
6The non-recourse states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Minnesota, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington. Note that, even in these states default entails additional costs such
as taxes (Form 1099-A) and a negative credit rating. However, our model identifies a novel channel that rationalizes
the existence of underwater mortgages in the absence of additional enforcement mechanisms.
7Near Negative Equity denotes mortgages with less than 5% of equity.
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the United States coincides with a period of a significant tightening of credit standards (see Figure
IV).
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Figure IV: Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Standards for Prime Mortgage Loans
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
We provide a numerical example below illustrating all possible payment strategies in our model:
payment, prepayment, and default. We show that different agents may adopt differentiated optimal
payment decisions and discuss the effect of financial markets liquidity and/or financial participation
constraints on these decisions. In particular, it is shown that underwater mortgages are a possible
equilibrium outcome.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out the model, notation and equilibrium
definition, Section 3 establishes equilibrium existence, Section 4 characterizes optimal payment
strategies, Section 5 contains a numerical example, and Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
The proofs of our results are left to an appendix.
2. The Model
Information structure. We consider a dynamic economy E with three periods. There is uncertainty
about the state of nature that will be realized, which belongs to a finite set S. The common and
symmetric information available at period t ∈ {0, 1, 2} is given by a partition of S, denoted by Ft.
We assume that there is no information at t = 0, i.e., F0 = {S}. Available information may increase
through time and economic agents are perfectly informed in the last period. That is, (i) Ft+1 is at
least as fine as Ft, where t ∈ {0, 1}; and (ii) F2 = {{s} : s ∈ S}.
A node is a pair (t, σ), where t ∈ {0, 1, 2} and σ ∈ Ft. Let D be the set of nodes in the economy
and ξ0 be the unique initial node. We denote by t(ξ) the date associated with ξ ∈ D, and by Dt
the set of nodes dated t. A node µ = (t(µ), σµ) is a successor of ξ = (t(ξ), σξ), denoted by µ > ξ,
when both t(µ) > t(ξ) and σµ ⊆ σξ. Let ξ+ be the set of immediate successor nodes of ξ ∈ D.
6 M. A. Iraola and J. P. Torres-Mart´ınez
Physical markets. At each node in D there is a finite and ordered set of commodities, L, which
are traded in spot markets and may suffer transformations through time. A bundle of commodities
v ∈ RL+ consumed at ξ ∈ D is transformed into a bundle Yµv at each node µ ∈ ξ+, where Yµ is a
(L× L)-matrix with non-negative entries. Let pξ = (pξ,l ; l ∈ L) ∈ RL+ be the vector of spot prices
at ξ ∈ D and p = (pξ ; ξ ∈ D) be the process of commodity prices.
Financial instruments. At each ξ ∈ D \ D2 a finite and ordered set J(ξ) of collateralized credit
contracts can be issued. Let qξ = (qξ,j ; j ∈ J(ξ)) ∈ RJ(ξ)+ be the vector of prices of credit contracts
issued at ξ ∈ D \ D2, and define q = (qξ ; ξ ∈ D \ D2). Promises associated with j ∈ J(ξ) are
pooled into a pass-through security that distributes payments made by borrowers of credit contract
j. Without loss of generality, we identify the pass-through security associated with a credit contract
j with the same subindex, and we assume that the price of the pass-through security coincides with
the price of the credit contract at the issue node.
Securities issued in the first period can be renegotiated. Hence, let piµ = (piµ,j ; j ∈ J(ξ0)) ∈ RJ(ξ0)+
be the resale price of securities at µ ∈ D1, and denote by pi = (piµ ; µ ∈ D1) the process of pass-
through resell prices. Let P := ∏ξ∈D (RL+ \ {0}) × ∏ξ∈D\D2 RJ(ξ)+ × RD1×J(ξ0)+ be the space of
commodity and financial prices (p, q, pi).8
Financial trading rules. The seller of one unit of credit contract j ∈ J(ξ) receives at ξ an amount
of resources qξ,j , is burdened to pledge a physical collateral Cξ,j ∈ RL+ \ {0}, and promises to
pay a coupon Aµ,j(p, q, pi) at each node µ > ξ. It is assumed that borrowers hold and consume
collateral guarantees. Furthermore, each credit line incorporates a prepayment rule, which specifies
the payment needed to reduce the amount of debt before terminal nodes. More precisely, borrowers
of j ∈ J(ξ0) can reduce at ξ ∈ D1 their short-positions in one unit by paying an amount of resources
Bξ,j(p, q, pi). At the end of this section we discuss the generality of our approach to credit contracts.
At intermediate nodes, heterogeneous payments across agents could be observed as a consequence
of liquidity shrinkages. That is, different borrowers of a credit contract j ∈ J(ξ0) may adopt different
decisions at ξ ∈ D1: some may pay, while others could prepay or default on their promises.
Since the only enforcement in case of default is the seizure of collateral, at terminal nodes bor-
rowers follow strategic default. Hence, at every µ ∈ D2, borrowers of one unit of a credit contract
j ∈ J(ξ0) pay the minimum between the original promise Aµ,j(p, q, pi) and the market value of the
collateral guarantee pµCµ,j , where Cµ,j := YµYµ−Cξ0,j and µ
− is the immediate predecessor node of
µ. Analogously, given ξ ∈ D1, borrowers of one unit of j ∈ J(ξ) pay at each terminal node µ ∈ ξ+
the minimum between Aµ,j(p, q, pi) and pµCµ,j , where Cµ,j := YµCξ,j . To shorten notations, let
8Our definition of the space of commodity prices does not allow the vector of commodity prices to be zero at any
node. However, this definition entails no loss of generality as we assume later the strict monotonicity of preferences.
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Rµ,j(p, q, pi) := min{Aµ,j(p, q, pi), pµCµ,j} be the unitary payment of security j ∈ J(µ−) ∪ J(ξ0) at
a node µ ∈ D2.
Given ξ ∈ D\D2, buyers of one unit of pass-through security j ∈ J(ξ) pay qξ,j , which entitles them
to obtain a payment Nµ,j at each µ > ξ. Unitary payments are endogenously determined and are
such that, node by node, resources distributed to lenders of security j match borrowers’ deliveries.
Let N := RD++ be the space of security payments, where D+ = {(µ, j) : ∃ξ ∈ D, (µ > ξ)∧(j ∈ J(ξ))}
is the set of pairs (µ, j) such that µ is a node where security j could yield deliveries.
Households. There is a finite set of agents, denoted by H. Each agent h ∈ H is characterized by a
utility function Uh : RD×L+ → R and a commodity endowment process wh = (whξ ; ξ ∈ D) ∈ RD×L+ .
Individuals may face restricted access to credit contracts. Thus, Jh(ξ) ⊆ J(ξ) is the set of credit
contracts issued at ξ that agent h ∈ H is able to trade. We assume that, for any ξ ∈ D \D2 and
j ∈ J(ξ), the set of individuals that can trade debt contract j is non-empty, i.e., Hj(ξ) := {h ∈ H :
j ∈ Jh(ξ)} 6= ∅.
At every ξ ∈ D, each h ∈ H chooses an autonomous consumption bundle xhξ ∈ RL+, i.e., con-
sumption in excess of the required collateral. Also, each agent h selects at ξ ∈ D \ D2 a debt
portfolio ϕhξ = (ϕ
h
ξ,j ; j ∈ Jh(ξ)) ∈ RJ
h(ξ)
+ . For each intermediate node ξ ∈ D1, ϕα,hξ,j ∈ [0, ϕhξ0,j ]
denotes the position on debt contract j ∈ Jh(ξ0) that h honors and maintains open. Analogously,
ϕβ,hξ,j ∈ [0, ϕhξ0,j ] is the part of agent h debt that is prepaid at ξ ∈ D1. Thus, agent h defaults on
ϕγ,hξ,j := (ϕ
h
ξ0,j
− ϕα,hξ,j − ϕβ,hξ,j ) units of contract j ∈ Jh(ξ0) at ξ ∈ D1.
Since borrowers consume collateral bundles, the total consumption at ξ ∈ D is given by
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h) :=

xhξ +
∑
j∈Jh(ξ)
Cξ,jϕ
h
ξ,j , when ξ = ξ0;
xhξ +
∑
j∈Jh(ξ)
Cξ,jϕ
h
ξ,j +
∑
j∈Jh(ξ0)
Cξ,jϕ
α,h
ξ,j , when ξ ∈ D1;
xhξ , when ξ ∈ D2.
The vector θhξ := (θ
h
ξ,j ; j ∈ J(ξ0) ∪ J(ξ)) ∈ RJ(ξ0)∪J(ξ)+ denotes the portfolio of passthrough
securities of agent h ∈ H at node ξ ∈ D \D2.
Given prices (p, q, pi) ∈ P and security payments N = (Nξ,j)(ξ,j)∈D+ ∈ N , the objective of each
household h ∈ H is to maximize utility by choosing a plan
(xh, θh, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h) ∈ X h := RD×L+ ×
∏
ξ∈D\D2
RJ(ξ0)∪J(ξ)+ ×
∏
ξ∈D\D2
RJ
h(ξ)
+ ×RD1×J
h(ξ0)
+ ×RD1×J
h(ξ0)
+ ,
which satisfies the following constraints:
(Bξ0) pξ0c
h
ξ0(x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h) + qξ0θ
h
ξ0 ≤ pξ0whξ0 +
∑
j∈Jh(ξ0)
qξ0,jϕ
h
ξ0,j ;
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for every intermediate node ξ ∈ D1,
(Bξ) pξc
h
ξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)+
∑
j∈J(ξ)
qξ,jθ
h
ξ,j+
∑
j∈J(ξ0)
piξ,jθ
h
ξ,j
≤ pξ
(
whξ + Yξc
h
ξ0(x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
+
∑
j∈Jh(ξ)
qξ,jϕ
h
ξ,j +
∑
j∈J(ξ0)
(piξ,j +Nξ,j) θ
h
ξ0,j
−
∑
j∈Jh(ξ0)
(
Aξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
α,h
ξ,j +Bξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
β,h
ξ,j + pξCξ,jϕ
γ,h
ξ,j
)
;
(Sξ) ϕ
γ,h
ξ,j := ϕ
h
ξ0,j−ϕα,hξ,j −ϕβ,hξ,j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Jh(ξ0);
and, for every terminal node ξ ∈ D2,
(Bξ) pξc
h
ξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h) ≤ pξ
(
whξ + Yξc
h
ξ−(x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
+
∑
j∈J(ξ0)∪J(ξ−)
Nξ,jθ
h
ξ−,j
−
 ∑
j∈Jh(ξ−)
Rξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
h
ξ−,j +
∑
j∈Jh(ξ0)
Rξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
α,h
ξ−,j
 .
Given (p, q, pi,N) ∈ P ×N , the choice set of h ∈ H—denoted by Γh(p, q, pi,N)—is the collection
of plans in X h that satisfy budget constraints (Bξ)ξ∈D and portfolio restrictions (Sξ)ξ∈D1 .
Definition. An equilibrium for E is given by prices and unitary payments (p, q, pi,N) ∈ P × N
jointly with allocations (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H ∈
∏
h∈H X h such that,
(i) For each h ∈ H, (xh, θh, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h) ∈ argmax {Uh(z), z ∈ Γh(p, q, pi,N)}.
(ii) Asset markets are cleared,∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j =
∑
h∈Hj(ξ)
ϕhξ,j , ∀ξ ∈ D \D2, ∀j ∈ J(ξ);
∑
h∈H
θ
h
µ,j =
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j , ∀µ ∈ D1, ∀j ∈ J(ξ0).
(iii) Physical markets are cleared,∑
h∈H
chξ0(x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h) =
∑
h∈H
whξ0 ;∑
h∈H
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h) =
∑
h∈H
(
whξ + Yξc
h
ξ−(x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
, ∀ξ > ξ0.
(iv) Security payments are compatible with deliveries,
Nξ,j
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j =
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
(
Aξ,jϕ
α,h
ξ,j +Bξ,jϕ
β,h
ξ,j + pξCξ,jϕ
γ,h
ξ,j
)
, ∀(ξ, j) ∈ D1 × J(ξ0);
Nξ,j
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j = Rξ,j(p, q, pi)
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕα,hξ−,j , ∀(ξ, j) ∈ D2 × J(ξ0);
Nξ,j = Rξ,j(p, q, pi), ∀ξ ∈ D2, ∀j ∈ J(ξ−).
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Equilibrium existence could easily be proved if security prices and payments were zero at each
node. Indeed, any pure spot commodity market equilibrium is an equilibrium for our financial
economy. However, if credit lines involve non-zero promises and collateral do not fully depreciate
through time, it is natural to expect positive deliveries for traded contracts (cf., Steinert and Torres-
Mart´ınez (2007)). Hence, we focus our attention on the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, i.e.,
an equilibrium such that, for some ξ ∈ D \D2, there exists j ∈ J(ξ) for which (Nµ,j)µ>ξ 6= 0.
On security payments. Let
(
(p, q, pi,N); (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
be an equilibrium and assume
that credit contract j ∈ J(ξ0) is traded. Then, at each ξ ∈ D1, payment, prepayment, and default
rates are given by
ταξ,j :=
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕα,hξ,j∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j
; τβξ,j :=
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕβ,hξ,j∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j
; τγξ,j :=
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕγ,hξ,j∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j
.
Therefore, unitary security payments can be rewritten as a weighted mean of borrowers’ deliveries.
That is, Nξ,j = τ
α
ξ,jAξ,j(p, q, pi) + τ
β
ξ,j Bξ,j(p, q, pi) + τ
γ
ξ,j pξCξ,j . Additionally, at every µ ∈ ξ+, we
have Nµ,j = (1− τβξ,j − τγξ,j)Rµ,j(p, q, pi). Hence, at terminal nodes, three forces could make security
payments lower than coupon values: previous and current default rates, jointly with prepayment risk.
Rental Markets. Our model implicitly incorporates rental contracts. For instance, suppose that
coupons of a credit contract j ∈ J(ξ0) are given by Aµ,j(p, q, pi) = pµCµ,j at any intermediate node
µ ∈ D1, and are zero at terminal nodes. Then, from the borrower’s perspective, credit contract j is
equivalent to a rental contract on collateral bundle Cξ0,j with a rental payment of pξ0Cξ0,j − qξ0,j .
From the lender’s perspective, contract k is a share on a real estate investment trust (REIT).
Positive margins between collateral and credit values. Let
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
be a non-trivial equilibrium. As in Geanakoplos and Zame (1997, 2002, 2007), under strict mono-
tonicity of preferences the following non-arbitrage condition holds: for each ξ ∈ D \ D2 and each
j ∈ J(ξ), the collateral value is greater than the amount of credit, i.e., pξCξ,j − qξ,j > 0. Indeed,
if this condition were not satisfied, agents could take advantage of an unlimited arbitrage oppor-
tunity. They may increase their utility by increasing the short position on contract j issued at ξ,
buying the associated collateral bundle with the borrowed resources, and defaulting at the successor
nodes µ ∈ ξ+. The existence of this arbitrage opportunity is not consistent with the optimality of
individual plans.
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These positive margins between collateral costs and borrowed resources are crucial to guarantee
equilibrium existence without imposing further assumptions on individuals’ financial participation
(see Section 3 for a detailed discussion).
Coupon specifications. Given prices (p, q, pi) ∈ P, for any asset j ∈ J(ξ0) the following coupon
specifications are compatible with our framework:
(i) Credit line with real promises: Coupons are specified as the market value of a commodity
bundle, i.e., Aµ,j(p, q, pi) := pµaµ,j , where aµ,j ∈ RL+. In this case, both real and nominal
interest rates depend on commodity prices and, therefore, are endogenously determined in
equilibrium. These contracts have been considered by Geanakoplos and Zame (1997, 2002,
2007) and Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez (2002, 2005, 2011).9
(ii) Fixed rate loan: Defined through a net real interest rate r ∈ (−1,+∞) which specifies a
coupon Aµ,j(p, q, pi) =
1
(d+d2) qξ0,j
pµa
pξ0a
∀µ > ξ0, where d = 1(1+r) , and a bundle a ∈ RL++
determining the price index
pµa
pξa
, which is a measure of purchasing power variation between
nodes ξ and µ ∈ ξ+.10
(iii) Adjustable rate loan: Coupons satisfy
Aµ,j(p, q, pi) = (rµ + κµ) qξ0,j
pµa
pξ0a
, ∀µ ∈ D1,
Aµ,j(p, q, pi) = (1 + rµ) (1− κµ−) qξ0,j
pµa
pξ0a
, ∀µ ∈ D2,
where κµ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the loan face value required to be paid at node µ ∈ D1.
Hence, between nodes µ ∈ D and η ∈ µ+ the borrower is required to pay a real net interest
rate rη ∈ (−1,+∞). Since there are no further restrictions on (κµ)µ∈D1 , the specification
above implies a variable repayment of the loan face value through time.11
9In contrast with our model, Geanakoplos and Zame (1997, 2002, 2007) and Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez
(2002, 2005, 2011) do not consider financial participation constraints. Furthermore, Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-
Mart´ınez (2005, 2011) assume that: (i) there are no liquidity contractions (i.e., for any ξ ∈ D1, J(ξ0) ⊆ J(ξ)); and
(ii) since credit contracts in J(ξ0) are re-issued at any intermediate node, prepayment costs are captured through
the market value of future promises (i.e., they implicitly assume that Bξ,j(p, q, pi) = Aξ,j(p, q, pi) + qξ,j , ∀(ξ, j) ∈
D1 × J(ξ0)).
10Note that it is also possible to consider an exogenously specified net nominal interest rate i ∈ (−1,+∞). It is
sufficient to define Aµ,j(p, q, pi) =
qξ0,j
(e+e2)
, ∀µ > ξ0, where e = 1(1+i) .
11The fixed interest loan defined in (ii) is a particular case obtained by setting (rµ, κµ) =
(
r, 1
(2+r)
)
, ∀µ > ξ0.
Furthermore, hybrid loans could be defined as in (iii) making interest rates independent of the realization of uncertainty
between some consecutive periods.
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Prepayment risk. Our model captures several types of forward and backward looking prepayment
rules. To illustrate these possibilities, fix prices (p, q, pi) ∈ P. Given a debt contract j ∈ J(ξ0)
assume that coupons are specified as in the adjustable-rate loan (iii) above. If at each µ ∈ D1 the
prepayment rule is Bµ,j(p, q, pi) = (1 + rµ)qξ0,j
pµa
pξ0a
, then the cost of prepaying a debt is equal to
the actualized loan’s face value adjusted by the price index. That is, we have a backward-looking
prepayment rule.
Alternatively, some financial instruments protect lenders from prepayment risk specifying a
forward-looking prepayment cost . In this case, borrowers who want to prepay debt before ter-
minal nodes are required to deliver the present value of promises. To capture this possibility
it is sufficient to specify strictly positive discount factors (ρ(µ);µ ∈ D2) such that, the prepay-
ment cost Bξ,j(p, q, pi) at node ξ ∈ D1 is given by either Aξ,j(p, q, pi) +
∑
µ∈ξ+
ρ(µ)Aµ,j(p, q, pi) or
Aξ,j(p, q, pi) +
∑
µ∈ξ+
ρ(µ)Rµ,j(p, q, pi). In the former case, the prepayment rule does not take into
account that borrowers may default at terminal nodes and, therefore, induces relatively more costly
prepayments compared with the latter. Discount factors could be exogenously determined to ensure
a lower bound for investment returns, even when all borrowers prepay.
Finally, future payments could be discounted considering idiosyncratic characteristics of potential
borrowers, with the aim of limiting prepayment risk. To this end, it is sufficient to ensure that agents
are more impatient than the implicit inter-temporal discount induced by the financial contract (see
Section 4 for a description of optimal payment strategies as functions of idiosyncratic factors).
3. Equilibrium Existence
The consideration of default and collateral requirements in our model allows to capture realistic
financial contracts in a general equilibrium framework. As it is well known, the absence of debt limits
may induce discontinuities on individual demands and, therefore, may compromise the existence of
equilibrium (cf., Hart (1975)). However, collateral requirements impose natural endogenous debt
limits as equilibrium debt is bounded by the market value of collateral guarantees. Therefore, in the
absence of financial participation constraints, it is possible to establish equilibrium existence without
imposing additional debt constraints or transversality conditions (cf., Geanakoplos and Zame (1997,
2002, 2007), and Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez (2002, 2005, 2011)).
To prove the existence equilibrium in a model which includes incomplete financial participation,
we require that, for any prices, agents have available a positive amount of resources at any state
of nature (i.e., choice sets must have a non-empty interior). Two ways to ensure this property
have been proposed in the literature of classical two-period models of incomplete financial markets.
First, some authors assume that, for any price, every agent has access to a positive amount of
credit through all financial contracts, a property referred to as financial survival (cf., Angeloni and
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Cornet (2006), Aouani and Cornet (2009, 2011), Cornet and Gopalan (2010)).12 Second, Seghir and
Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) assume that preferences satisfy an impatience condition that privilege first
period consumption.13
Our main result below establishes equilibrium existence without imposing financial survival or
impatience conditions on preferences. We find an equilibrium allocation as a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium of a generalized game. In this game, commodity prices are normalized to be non-zero vectors
and, therefore, individuals have positive available resources at each state of nature since endow-
ments are interior points of the consumption space. Although in the generalized game we impose
upper bounds on asset prices, we do not require an impatience condition on preferences as in Seghir
and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011). The existence of a positive haircut between the collateral cost and the
amount of borrowing induces natural upper bounds on financial prices.
Theorem 1. An economy E that satisfies the following assumptions has a non-trivial equilibrium.
(A1) For each h ∈ H, Uh is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly quasi-concave.
(A2) For each h ∈ H, (Whξ : ξ ∈ D) ∈ RD×L++ , with Whξ0 := whξ0 and Whξ := whξ + YξWhξ− , ∀ξ > ξ0.
(A3) Given (ξ, j) ∈ D+, Aξ,j : P → R+ is a continuous function.
(A4) Given (ξ, j) ∈ D1 × J(ξ0), Bξ,j is continuous and satisfies Bξ,j(·) ≥ Aξ,j(·).
(A5) There exist ξ ∈ D and j ∈ J(ξ) such that, for each commodity price p ∈ RD×L++ there is a
successor node µ ∈ ξ+ for which min{Aµ,j(p, ·), ‖YµCµ,j‖Σ} > 0.
4. Characterizing Prepayment Risk and Default
Before analyzing more complex decisions, let us consider some simple characterizations of bor-
rower’s optimal payment strategies. Assuming that preferences are strictly monotone, we have that:
(1) At terminal nodes, all borrowers of a credit contract honor their commitments only if promises
are lower than the collateral value, i.e., Aξ,j(p, q, pi) < pξCξ,j .
(2) At an intermediate node ξ ∈ D1, suppose that for some j ∈ J(ξ0) the collateral value is lower
than the coupon value, pξCξ,j < Aξ,j(p, q, pi). Then, the optimal strategy of any borrower of credit
contract j is to default at node ξ, because the associated collateral bundle could be consumed at a
lower cost by defaulting and buying back the collateral.
12This assumption implies that, for any prices, agents have either a positive value of initial endowments or access
to a positive amount of credit. Therefore, they have a positive amount of resources available at each state of nature.
13In their theoretical framework, commodity prices are normalized to ensure that at every node agents are able
to obtain resources by selling their endowments. At the same time, asset prices are bounded from above to guarantee
the continuity of individuals’ choice set correspondences. Thus, the impatience condition is crucial to avoid frictions
associated with these upper bounds on asset prices.
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(3) Prepayment and default on a contract j ∈ J(ξ0) coexist at a node ξ ∈ D1 only if these strategies
cost the same, Bξ,j(p, q, pi) = pξCξ,j . Indeed, both decisions finalize the contractual commitment
and, thus, borrowers who want to conclude the contract before terminal nodes will always choose
the less costly.
(4) Given ξ ∈ D1 assume that Bξ,j(p, q, pi) 6= pξCξ,j . Then, some agents could pay coupon
while others could close the short position at ξ only if Aξ,j(p, q, pi) < Bξ,j(p, q, pi) < pξCξ,j or
Aξ,j(p, q, pi) < pξCξ,j < Bξ,j(p, q, pi). In the first case, some borrowers of j may pay the coupon
while others prepay. In the second case, a negative equity mortgage, some borrowers may default
while others honor their promises maintaining the short position. We illustrate these possibilities
with a numerical example in the next section.
We now provide necessary and sufficient conditions inducing borrowers to close short positions be-
fore terminal nodes, either prepaying or defaulting. These conditions depend on observable market
variables and contractual characteristics. We begin with results that characterize optimal payment
strategies independently of the existence of alternative credit opportunities. More precisely, at each
intermediate node ξ ∈ D1, if the cost associated with closing a debt position on j ∈ J(ξ0) is lower
than the present value of commitments, then agents prepay or default on their j-debt. In addition,
if the cost of closing a debt is higher than the present value of future commitments, then borrowers
whose optimal behavior is not restricted by collateral constraints will pay the coupon and maintain
open the short position.
Proposition 1. Assume (A1)-(A2), and that for all agents h ∈ H, Uh : RD×L → R is continuously
differentiable. Let
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
be an equilibrium. For each h ∈ H, let
(λh(η))η∈D be agent h’s Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with budget constraints.
Fix (ξ, j) ∈ D1 × Jh(ξ0) and h ∈ Hj(ξ0) such that ϕhξ0,j > 0. Define
Φhξ,j(p, q, pi) := min{Bξ,j(p, q, pi), pξCξ,j} −
Aξ,j(p, q, pi) + ∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)
λh(ξ)
Rµ,j(p, q, pi)
 .
If Φhξ,j(p, q, pi) < 0, then agent h closes short positions on j at ξ.
If Φhξ,j(p, q, pi) > 0, then agent h reduces short-positions on j at ξ only when some collateral con-
straints induced by credit contract j are binding at ξ, i.e., xhξ /∈ RL++.
The previous proposition shows that agents close short positions when either prepayment or de-
fault cost is sufficiently low. The evaluation of the cost level associated to the early end of a financial
commitment depends of the degree of impatience of the borrower. To illustrate this idea, consider
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the following example, which follows the notation introduced in Section 2.
Example. Assume that j ∈ Jh(ξ0) is an adjustable rate loan, that there is no default in the last
period, and that the net real interest rate only depends on the time period.
Consider a backward-looking prepayment rule and let %hξ be agent h’s equilibrium degree of
impatience at node ξ ∈ D1, defined as 11+%hξ =
∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)
λh(ξ)
pµa
pξa
. Then, it follows from Proposition 1
that agent h closes short positions on j at ξ when %hξ is lower than the last-period rate of interest
r2. Alternatively, consider the forward-looking prepayment rule Bξ,j = Aξ,j +
∑
µ∈ξ+
ρ(µ)Aµ,j . In
this case, let us define %ξ by
1
1+%ξ
=
∑
µ∈ξ+
ρ(µ)
pµa
pξa
. Hence, if %hξ < %ξ, then agent h closes short
positions on j at ξ. Therefore, independently of the availability of alternative credit opportunities,
(relatively) patient agents close short positions. 
Proposition 1 ensures that, when collateral constraints are not binding, underwater loans are
possible in equilibrium. Indeed, suppose that there exists a node ξ ∈ D1 such that, for some j ∈ J(ξ0)
and h ∈ Hj(ξ0) we have ϕhξ0,j > 0 and Bξ,j(p, q, pi) > pξCξ,j > Aξ,j(p, q, pi) +
∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)
λh(ξ)
Rµ,j(p, q, pi).
In this situation, if agent h demands autonomous consumption of all commodities used as collateral
by credit contract j, then the short position on this asset is maintained at ξ.
The existence of alternative credit opportunities at a node ξ ∈ D1 may increase borrowers’ options
to close a debt on a credit contract j ∈ J(ξ0), a possibility that is particularly relevant when the
closing cost—min{Bξ,j(p, q, pi), pξCξ,j}—is higher than the present value of commitments, computed
as in Proposition 1 by means of individual inter-temporal income marginal rates of substitution.
The following result shows that, if alternative credit opportunities are available, borrowers’ opti-
mal payment strategies are determined by comparing collateral margins and expected commitments
across debt contracts.
Proposition 2. Assume (A1)-(A2), and that for all agents h ∈ H, Uh : RD×L → R is continuously
differentiable. Let
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
be an equilibrium. Fix (ξ, j) ∈ D1 ×
Jh(ξ0) such that Ψξ,j(p, q, pi) := min{Bξ,j(p, q, pi), pξCξ,j} − Aξ,j(p, q, pi) > 0. For each h ∈ H, let
(λh(η))η∈D be agent h’s Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with budget constraints. Then, agent
h ∈ Hj(ξ0) closes short positions on j if there exists an alternative credit line k ∈ Jh(ξ) for which
Cξ,k
qξ,k
≤ Cξ,j
Ψξ,j(p, q, pi)
, and
∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)
Rµ,k(p, q, pi)
qξ,k
<
∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)
Rµ,j(p, q, pi)
Ψξ,j(p, q, pi)
.
In this situation, agent h prepays debt j if and only if Bξ,j(p, q, pi) ≤ pξCξ,j.
Consider a rental market for bundle Cξ,j at node ξ ∈ D1. That is, suppose that there exits a
credit contract k ∈ J(ξ) characterized by Cξ,k = Cξ,j and Aµ,k(p, q, pi) = pµYµCξ,j , at any µ ∈ ξ+.
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Thus, given an equilibrium
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
, some agents can rent Cξ,j by
paying pξCξ,j − qξ,k. An agent who maintains a short position on j, in addition to the consumption
of the associated collateral bundle (an action that could be implemented through the rental market)
receives at terminal nodes the excess of the collateral over the promise. Hence, closing short positions
on j and entering into the rental market is optimal only if the rental price of bundle Cξ,j is lower
than the coupon value associated with j, i.e., pξCξ,j − qξ,k < Aξ,j(p, q, pi). Additionally, it follows
from Proposition 2 that, if Ψξ,j(p, q, pi) > 0 and the rental cost of Cξ,j is low enough, then an agent
who has access to contract k closes short positions on asset j. Indeed, it is sufficient that,
pξCξ,j − qξ,k < Aξ,j(p, q, pi) +
(
pξCξ,j −Aξ,j(p, q, pi)
)1−
∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)pµCµ,j∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)Rµ,j(p, q, pi)
 .
Notice that, this condition implies that the second inequality in Proposition 2 is satisfied. Moreover,
as Ψξ,j(p, q, pi) > 0, the right hand side of the inequality above is lower than or equal to Aξ,j(p, q, pi)
implying that the first inequality in Proposition 2 is also satisfied.
It follows from Proposition 2 above that the existence of attractive credit opportunities avoids
underwater loans in equilibrium. In this direction, and under the appropriate specification of credit
contracts, the finite horizon version of Araujo, Pa´scoa, and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) is a particular
case of our framework.14
Our previous propositions are based on individual income shadow values. However, under some
circumstances optimal payment strategies can be specified in terms of observable variables.
Corollary. Assume (A1)-(A2), and that for all agents h ∈ H, Uh : RD×L → R is continuously
differentiable. Let
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
be an equilibrium. Fix (ξ, j) ∈ D1 ×
J(ξ0) for which Ψξ,j(p, q, pi) > 0. If the following conditions are satisfied,
Cξ,k
qξ,k
≤ Cξ,j
Ψξ,j(p, q, pi)
, and
(
Rµ,k(p, q, pi)
qξ,k
)
µ∈ξ+
<
(
Rµ,j(p, q, pi)
Ψξ,j(p, q, pi)
)
µ∈ξ+
,
then all agents h ∈ Hj(ξ0) close their short positions on credit contract j at ξ.
14Indeed, given (ξ, j) ∈ D1 × J(ξ0) suppose that there exists a debt contract k ∈ J(ξ) with the same collateral
requirements and future promises as j, i.e., Cξ,k = Cξ,j and Rµ,k(p, q, q) = Rµ,j(p, q, pi), ∀(p, q, pi) ∈ P, ∀µ ∈ ξ+.
Then, j-borrowers close their debt at ξ when Ψξ,j(p, q, pi) < qξ,k and they would be indifferent if both magnitudes
were equal. Since Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) do not allow for liquidity contractions, the prepayment
cost is implicitly given by Aξ,j(p, q, pi)+qξ,k. Therefore, borrowers optimally conclude debt contracts at intermediate
nodes, defaulting if the collateral value pξCξ,j is lower than the prepayment cost Aξ,j(p, q, pi) + qξ,k. Thus, their
model does not capture underwater mortgages.
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5. Negative Equity in Equilibrium
The objective of this section is to illustrate the existence of differentiated optimal payment strate-
gies when agents face credit liquidity constraints, with a particular attention to the presence of
negative equity loans.
Thus, by means of an example, we show that in equilibrium we can observe: (i) prepayment of
debts in presence of cheaper credit options; (ii) prepayment without alternative access to credit;
(iii) payment of coupons, even for negative equity loans; and (iv) default on the original promises.
Example. Assume that there is uncertainty only between t = 0 and t = 1. In t = 1 there are
three states of nature {u,m, d}. Thus, let D = {0, u,m, d, u+,m+, d+} be the event-tree. There
is only one commodity which is perfectly durable between periods t = 1 and t = 2, and satisfies
Yu = Ym = 0.5 and Yd = 9/22. At each node, the commodity price is normalized to one.
Credit contracts are issued at nodes {0,m} and are securitized into pass-through securities. One
unit of credit contract j0 issued at ξ = 0 delivers q0,j0 to the borrower, which is burdened to
constitute a collateral of C0,j0 = 11/4 and has the commitment to pay coupons Aξ,j0 = 1 at nodes
ξ 6= {0,m+} and Aξ,j0 = 2 at node ξ = m+. The constituted collateral must be maintained through
the duration of the contract. Borrowers may prepay their debt at nodes ξ ∈ {u,m, d} delivering
Bξ,j0 units of the commodity, where (Bu,j0 , Bm,j0 , Bd,j0) = (5/4, 3/2, 5/4). Additionally, one unit of
debt contract jm issued at node ξ = m delivers qm,jm to borrowers, who must constitute a collateral
Cm,jm = 33/8 and commit to pay a coupon Aξ,jm = 1 at node ξ = m
+.
Individuals can invest on securities associated with the pooling of credit contracts. The security
associated with credit contract j0 is negotiated at every node in periods t ∈ {0, 1} and distributes
payments made by borrowers. The unitary payment of security j0 at node ξ > 0 is denoted by Nξ,j0 .
The security associated with credit contract jm is negotiated only at node m and delivers Nm+,jm
at node ξ = m+.
Agents h ∈ {A,B,C} are characterized by the following utility functions and endowments,
UA(x0, xu, xm, xd, xu+ , xm+ , xd+) = x0 +
3
24
xu +
3
24
xm +
12
24
xd +
12
96
xu+ +
12
96
xm+ +
48
96
xd+ ;
(wA0 , w
A
u , w
A
m, w
A
d , w
A
u+ , w
A
m+ , w
A
d+) = (3/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
UB(x0, xu, xm, xd, xu+ , xm+ , xd+) = x0 +
2
24
xu +
2
24
xm +
8
24
xd +
1
96
xu+ +
1
96
xm+ +
4
96
xd+ ;
(wB0 , w
B
u , w
B
m, w
B
d , w
B
u+ , w
B
m+ , w
B
d+) = (2, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1);
UC(x0, xu, xm, xd, xu+ , xm+ , xd+) = x0 +
1
24
xu +
1
24
xm +
4
24
xd +
4
96
xu+ +
4
96
xm+ +
16
96
xd+ ;
(wC0 , w
C
u , w
C
m, w
C
d , w
C
u+ , w
C
m+ , w
C
d+) = (2, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1).
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Allocations of consumption and financial positions are chosen so as to maximize utility subject
to budget constraints and portfolio restrictions defined in Section 2.
An equilibrium for this economy is given by15
((q0,j0 , qm,jm); (piu,j0 , pim,j0 , pid,j0)) =
((
3
4
,
1
2
)
;
(
1
4
, 0,
1
4
))
;
(
(Nu,j0 , Nm,j0 , Nd,j0 , Nu+,j0 , Nm+,j0 , Nd+,j0);Nm+,jm
)
=
((
9
8
,
3
2
,
17
16
,
1
2
, 0,
1
2
)
; 1
)
;
(xA0 , x
A
u , x
A
m, x
A
d , x
A
u+ , x
A
m+ , x
A
d+) =
(
0 ,
9
4
,
10
4
,
17
8
,
13
4
,
7
2
,
25
8
)
;
(xB0 , x
B
u , x
B
m, x
B
d , x
B
u+ , x
B
m+ , x
B
d+) =
(
11
4
,
33
8
,
33
8
,
9
8
,
25
8
,
25
8
,
9
8
)
;
(xC0 , x
C
u , x
C
m, x
C
d , x
C
u+ , x
C
m+ , x
C
d+) =
(
11
4
,
31
8
,
29
8
, 1,
31
8
,
29
8
, 2
)
.
 
A: Maintains the investment. 
B: Pays the coupon. 
C: Prepays debt. 
A: Liquidates previous investment and buys 
one unit of the new security. 
B: Prepays debt and sells one unit of mj . 
C: Prepays debt. 
A: Maintains the investment. 
B: Pays the coupon. 
C: Defaults. 
u 
+u
 
+m  
+d
 
m 
d 
A: Invests in two units of the security. 
B: Sells one unit of 0j . 
C: Sells one unit of 0j . 
Note that in Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) the optimal actions of agents B and
C at node d could be equilibrium outcomes only if the prepayment and collateral costs were the
same. However, in our model, although the prepayment cost is 10/8 and the depreciated collateral
value is 9/8, liquidity constraints make these heterogeneous payment strategies compatible with
equilibrium.
Since marginal rates of substitution between two immediate successor nodes are measures of indi-
vidual impatience, agent A is relatively patient. Moreover, as agent A′s endowment is concentrated
15The individual optimality of these allocations has been verified through a simplex algorithm.
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at t = 0, A decides to invest in the first period. Agent B, who is more impatient than A between
t = 0 and t = 1, and the most impatient consumer between periods t = 1 and t = 2, prefers to
borrow at t = 0. Agent C, who is as patient as A between the last two periods, is the most impa-
tient agent between periods t = 0 and t = 1 and, therefore, borrows resources at t = 0 to anticipate
consumption.
However, between periods t = 1 and t = 2, B is more impatient than C. Therefore, at node
u, where both borrowers could prepay their debts, B decides to pay the coupon and C prepays.
Hence, even though agents have enough resources to prepay their debts, this decision depends on
preferences and endowments. Furthermore, if there are more convenient borrowing options, the
most impatient agents may prepay their debts and make use of these alternative credit instruments.
For instance, at node m, agent B prepays and issues the new credit contract.
We would like to highlight that agents do not necessarily default on their debt when the collateral
value is lower than the prepayment value (underwater mortgage). This decision depends on financial
markets’ liquidity and debtors’ wealth. For instance, since B is impatient, prefers to pay coupons
at d and d+ rather than close the contract by delivering the collateral guarantee at d. Notice that
agent B maintains a negative equity as a consequence of the liquidity shrinkage, although incomplete
financial participation would have the same impact. 
6. Concluding Remarks
We propose a model of long-term loans backed by physical collateral, in which borrowers may
prepay their debts before terminal nodes. This model extends Geanakoplos and Zame (1997, 2002,
2007) theoretical framework to allow for long-term loans, liquidity contractions, and incomplete
financial participation. Without requiring financial survival assumptions or impatience conditions
of preferences, we prove existence of equilibrium and provide a theoretical characterization of optimal
payment strategies.
We show that, agents decide to close their debts before terminal dates—either prepaying or
defaulting—if closing a short position is less costly than the expected present value of commit-
ments. However, this condition is not homogeneous across agents and, hence, optimal payment
strategies depend on individual characteristics. Moreover, this decision also depends on financial
markets liquidity and on participation constraints. The absence of better credit opportunities makes
some individuals more prone to honor original commitments in order to maintain the consumption of
collateralized durable goods. That is, borrowers can react to liquidity shrinkages or to limited access
to credit by paying coupons of debt instead of closing short positions. Therefore, the lack of liquid-
ity or the presence of participation constraints could make it optimal for borrowers to honor their
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commitments even when the collateral value is lower than the prepayment value (underwater mort-
gage). We also provide a numerical example illustrating that optimal payment strategies—payment,
prepayment, and default—depend on individual characteristics and financial markets liquidity.
It is well known that, without liquidity contractions, collateral avoids Ponzi schemes and equilib-
rium exists in infinite horizon collateralized asset markets. Furthermore, the absence of asset pricing
bubbles on durable commodity prices avoids bubbles on collateralized securities (see Araujo, Pa´scoa,
and Torres-Mart´ınez (2002, 2005, 2011)). As a matter of future research, we plan to extend these
results to our model with liquidity contractions, incomplete financial participation, and prepayment.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. We construct a non-trivial equilibrium for our economy E as a Nash equilibrium of
a generalized game G(Q) where abstract players choose prices and security payments, and agents maximize
objective functions by choosing allocations in truncated budget sets. The parameter Q is an upper bound
for financial prices, which is non-binding in equilibrium.
Spaces of strategies
In G(Q) prices are restricted to belong to ∆(Q) :=
(∏
ξ∈D\D2 ∆ξ(Q)
)
×
(∏
ξ∈D2 ∆ξ
)
⊂ P, where
∆ξ0(Q) :=
{
(pξ0 , qξ0) ∈ RL+ × RJ(ξ0)+ : ‖pξ0‖Σ = 1 ∧ qξ0 ∈ [0, Q]J(ξ0)
}
;
∆ξ(Q) :=
{
(pξ, qξ, piξ) ∈ RL+ × RJ(ξ)+ × RJ(ξ0)+ : ‖pξ‖Σ = 1 ∧ (qξ, piξ) ∈ [0, Q]J(ξ)∪J(ξ0)
}
, ∀ξ ∈ D1;
∆ξ :=
{
pξ ∈ RL+ : ‖pξ‖Σ = 1
}
, ∀ξ ∈ D2;
and the upper bound Q is exogenously fixed and satisfies
Q > max
ξ∈D\D2
max
j∈J(ξ)
‖Cξ,j‖Σ.
Our equilibrium definition guarantees that there exists Ω > 0 such that, each collection of alloca-
tions (xh, θh, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H ∈
∏
h∈H X h satisfying (Sξ)ξ∈D1 and market clearing conditions (ii)-(iii)
is bounded from above by Ω(1, . . . , 1) ∈∏h∈H X h. Therefore, we assume that
Ω > 2 max
ξ∈D\D2
∑
h∈H
‖Whξ ‖Σ
min
k∈J(ξ)
‖Cξ,k‖Σ .
Let X h(Ω) be the set of allocations in X h such that its coordinates are lower than or equal to 2Ω. Since
∆(Q) is compact, Assumptions (A3)-(A4) and condition (iv) in the equilibrium definition guarantee that
the unitary security payments associated with traded debt contracts are bounded. Thus, there exists Φ > 0
such that, for each traded debt contract j we have Nµ,j < Φ, ∀µ ∈ D : (µ, j) ∈ D+. Hence, we restrict
security payments Nµ,j to Nµ,j(Φ) := [0,Φ], ∀j ∈ J(ξ), ∀µ > ξ. Let N (Φ) := ∏(µ,j)∈D+ Nµ,j(Φ).
Players
The generalized game G(Q) has a finite number of players whose objectives are:
(i) Given a vector of prices and security payments ((p, q, pi), N) ∈ ∆(Q)×N (Φ), each agent h ∈ H maximizes
the objective function Uh choosing allocations in Γh(p, q, pi,N) ∩ X h(Ω).
(ii) Given allocations (xh, θh, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H ∈
∏
h∈H X h(Ω),
- A player chooses prices (pξ0 , qξ0) ∈ ∆ξ0(Q) to maximize
pξ0
∑
h∈H
(
chξ0(x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)− whξ0
)
+
∑
j∈J(ξ0)
qξ0,j
∑
h∈H
θhξ0,j −
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j
 .
- For each ξ ∈ D1, a player chooses prices (pξ, qξ, piξ) ∈ ∆ξ(Q) to maximize
pξ
∑
h∈H
(
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)− whξ − Yξchξ0(xh, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
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+
∑
j∈J(ξ)
qξ,j
∑
h∈H
θhξ,j −
∑
h∈Hj(ξ)
ϕhξ,j
+ ∑
j∈J(ξ0)
piξ,j
∑
h∈H
(
θhξ,j − θhξ0,j
)
.
- For each ξ ∈ D2, a player chooses pξ ∈ ∆ξ to maximize
pξ
∑
h∈H
(
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)− whξ − Yξchξ−(xh, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
.
(iii) Given
(
(p, q, pi), (xh, θh, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
) ∈ ∆(Q)×∏h∈H X h(Ω),
- For each (µ, j) ∈ D1 × J(ξ0), a player chooses Nµ,j ∈ [Rµ,j(p, q, pi),Φ] to maximize
−
Nµ,j ∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j −
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
(
Aµ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
α,h
µ,j +Bµ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
β,h
µ,j + pµCµ,jϕ
γ,h
ξ,j )
)2 .
- For each (µ, j) ∈ D2 × J(ξ0), a player chooses Nµ,j ∈ Nµ,j(Φ) to maximize
−
Nµ,j ∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j −Rµ,j(p, q, pi)
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕh,α
µ−,j
2 .
- For each (µ, j) ∈ D2 × J(ξ), a player chooses Nµ,j ∈ Nµ,j(Φ) to maximize − (Nµ,j −Rµ,j(p, q, pi))2 .
A vector
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
∈ ∆(Q) × N (Φ) × ∏h∈H X h(Ω) is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium for the generalized game G(Q) if it solves all the problems above.
Existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria for G(Q)
Under Assumptions (A1)-(A4), each player in the generalized game G(Q) has a continuous correspondence
of admissible strategies, with non-empty, compact, and convex values. Also, players’ objective functions are
continuous and quasi-concave on their own strategy. Since ∆(Q) × N (Φ) × ∏h∈H X h(Ω) is non-empty,
convex, and compact, Berge’s Maximum Theorem guarantees that best-reply correspondences are upper
hemicontinuous and have non-empty, compact and convex values.
Applying Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem to the set-value mapping which associates to each z ∈ ∆(Q)×
N (Φ)×∏h∈H X h(Ω) the cartesian product of players’ best-reply strategies to z, we obtain an equilibrium
for G(Q).
From Cournot-Nash equilibria of G(Q) to non-trivial equilibria of E
Let
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for G(Q).
We have that,
(1)
∑
h∈H
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h) ≤
∑
h∈H
Whξ =⇒ qξ,j < pξCξ,j , ∀ξ ∈ D\D2, ∀j ∈ J(ξ); 16
16Fix ξ ∈ D\D2 such that
∑
h∈H c
h
ξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h) ≤∑h∈HWhξ and assume that, for some j ∈ J(ξ), pξCξ,j ≤ qξ,j .
The strict monotonicity of preferences (Assumption (A1)) implies that, for every player h ∈ Hj(ξ), ϕhξ,j = Ω.
Otherwise, player h could increase Uh without any additional cost, by increasing the short-position on j at node
ξ, consuming the associated collateral, and defaulting on this additional short-position at the successor nodes of
ξ. Therefore, it follows that Ω
∥∥Cξ,j∥∥Σ ≤ ‖Cξ,j‖Σ ∑h∈Hj(ξ) ϕhξ,j ≤ ∥∥∥∑h∈H chξ (xh, ϕh, ϕα,h)∥∥∥Σ ≤ ∑h∈H ‖Whξ ‖Σ,
which contradicts the fact that Ω > 2 max
ξ∈D\D2
∑
h∈H
‖Whξ ‖Σ
min
k∈J(ξ)
‖Cξ,k‖Σ .
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(2)
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j <
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j =⇒ piξ,j ≤ pξCξ,j , ∀ξ ∈ D1, ∀j ∈ J(ξ0).17
Therefore, if there is no excess of demand in physical market at a node ξ ∈ D \D2, then upper bounds on
credit contract prices are non-binding at this node, i.e., for any j ∈ J(ξ) we have that qξ,j < Q. Analogously,
if there is excess of demand for security j ∈ J(ξ0) at ξ ∈ D1, then piξ,j < Q.
Notice that, for each agent h ∈ H the allocation (xh, θh, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h) belongs to Γh(p, q, pi,N)∩X h(Ω)
and, therefore, it satisfies inequalities (Bξ)ξ∈D and (Sξ)ξ∈D1 . Hence, adding restrictions (Bξ0) across agents,
we conclude that the objective function of the player who chooses (pξ0 , qξ0) has an optimal value less than
or equal to zero. Since (pξ0 , qξ0) ∈ ∆ξ0(Q), this implies that∑
h∈H
(
chξ0(x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)− whξ0
)
≤ 0,
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0 ≤
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0 .
18
Hence, for each agent h, (xhξ0 , θ
h
ξ0 , ϕ
h
ξ0
) ≤ Ω(1, . . . , 1). That is, upper bounds on individual allocations chosen
at ξ0 are non-binding. For this reason, monotonicity of preferences implies that both pξ0  0 and budget
constraints at ξ0 are binding. We conclude that the equilibrium value of the objective function of the player
who chooses (pξ0 , qξ0) is zero, which in turn implies that commodity markets feasibility holds at ξ0 and, for
each j ∈ J(ξ0), ∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j ≤
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j , qξ0,j
( ∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j −
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j
)
= 0.
Fix an intermediate node ξ ∈ D1. The definition of Φ guarantees that, for each j ∈ J(ξ0),
Nξ,j
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j =
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
(
Aξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
α,h
ξ,j +Bξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
β,h
ξ,j + pξCξ,j(ϕ
h
ξ0,j
− ϕα,hξ,j − ϕβ,hξ,j )
)
.
From this identity, adding (Bξ) across agents and given that
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0 ≤
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0 , we get
pξ
∑
h∈H
(
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)− whξ − Yξchξ0(xh, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
+
∑
j∈J(ξ)
qξ,j
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j −
∑
h∈Hj(ξ)
ϕhξ,j
+ ∑
j∈J(ξ0)
piξ,j
∑
h∈H
(
θ
h
ξ,j − θhξ0,j
)
≤ 0.
Therefore, as in ξ0, upper bounds on individual consumption allocations are non-binding at ξ. Hence, the
monotonicity of preferences ensures that pξ  0 and that budget constraints at ξ are satisfied with equality.
Furthermore, for any j ∈ J(ξ) we have that ∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j ≤
∑
h∈Hj(ξ)
ϕhξ,j , otherwise qξ,j = Q which contradicts
(1). Analogously, it follows from condition (2) that, for every j ∈ J(ξ0) we have that ∑
h∈H
(
θ
h
ξ,j − θhξ0,j
)
≤ 0.
17Fix ξ ∈ D1 and j ∈ J(ξ0) such that
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j
<
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j . Then, there is at least one lender of security j at
node ξ. On the other hand, if piξ,j > pξCξ,j , agents prefer to buy bundle Cξ,j instead of investing on security j.
Indeed, buying Cξ,j provides future payments greater than or equal to security j’s deliveries and, at the same time,
allows to consume Cξ,j . Therefore, the existence of long positions on j at node ξ implies that piξ,j ≤ pξCξ,j .
18If there exists excess of demand in a commodity market l, then the player who determines prices at ξ0 can make
his objective function positive by fixing asset prices to zero and concentrating commodity prices on l, i.e., setting
pl = 1. Thus, there is no excess of demand in commodity markets. Hence, if there is some credit contract j ∈ J(ξ0)
with excess of investment, the player who chooses prices will make qξ0,j = Q, which is a contradiction.
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Thus, at node ξ commodity markets feasibility conditions hold and
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j ≤
∑
h∈Hj(ξ)
ϕhξ,j , qξ,j
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j −
∑
h∈Hj(ξ)
ϕhξ,j
 = 0, ∀j ∈ J(ξ),
∑
h∈H
(
θ
h
ξ,j − θhξ0,j
)
≤ 0, piξ,j
∑
h∈H
(
θ
h
ξ,j − θhξ0,j
)
= 0, ∀j ∈ J(ξ0).
Fix a terminal node ξ ∈ D2. Analogous arguments to those made above guarantee that, for each
j ∈ J(ξ−), Nξ,j = Rξ,j(p, q, pi). Also, for each j ∈ J(ξ0),
Nξ,j
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,j = Rξ,j(p, q, pi)
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕα,h
ξ−,j .
Hence, inequalities
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ−,k ≤
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,k ≤
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕhξ0,k and
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ−,j ≤
∑
h∈Hj(ξ−)
ϕhξ−,j , which hold for
any (k, j) ∈ J(ξ0)× J(ξ−), guarantee that after adding (Bξ) across agents we get that,
pξ
∑
h∈H
(
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)− whξ − Yξchξ0(xh, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
≤ 0.
Since pξ ∈ ∆ξ, there is no excess of demand in commodity markets at ξ and, hence, upper bounds on indi-
vidual allocations chosen at ξ are non-binding. We conclude that commodity markets feasibility conditions
hold at ξ and that pξ  0.
Therefore, p 0 and commodity market clearing conditions hold at D.
Given ξ ∈ D \D2 and j ∈ J(ξ), Nµ,j ≥ Rµ,j(p, q, pi), ∀µ ∈ ξ+. Since p 0, Assumption (A5) guarantees
that there exists at least one security with non-trivial payments. Moreover, for each security with non-trivial
payments, the market clearing condition holds at the emission node. Otherwise qξ,j = 0, a contradiction
with the strict monotonicity of preferences and the fact that upper bounds on optimal individual allocations
are non-binding. Therefore, for each ξ ∈ D \ D2 and j ∈ J(ξ) such that (Nµ,j)µ>ξ 6= 0, we obtain∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j =
∑
h∈Hj(ξ)
ϕhξ,j .
If for some ξ ∈ D and j ∈ J(ξ), ∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ,j <
∑
h∈Hj(ξ)
ϕhξ,j , then qξ,j = 0 and (Nµ,j)µ>ξ = 0. Therefore,
maintaining optimality, we can substitute θ
h
ξ,j with
θ̂hξ,j :=
 ϕ
h
ξ,j , for any h ∈ Hj(ξ0);
0, otherwise.
Also, if there exist (µ, j) ∈ D1×J(ξ0) for which ∑
h∈H
(
θ
h
µ,j − θhξ0,j
)
< 0, then piµ,j = 0 and (Nξ,j)ξ∈D2 = 0.
19
Therefore, we can substitute θ
h
µ,j with θ̂
h
µ,j := θ
h
ξ0,j maintaining optimality. After these modifications,
financial market clearing conditions hold.
Furthermore, these substitutions guarantee that, for each ξ ∈ D1 and j ∈ J(ξ0),
Nξ,j
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j =
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
(
Aξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
α,h
ξ,j +Bξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
β,h
ξ,j + pξCξ,j(ϕ
h
ξ0,j
− ϕα,hξ,j − ϕβ,hξ,j )
)
.
19This may be a consequence of debt prepayment.
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Also, for each ξ ∈ D2 and j ∈ J(ξ0), we have
Nξ,j
∑
h∈H
θ
h
ξ0,j −Rξ,j(p, q, pi)
∑
h∈Hj(ξ0)
ϕα,h
ξ−,j = 0.
It follows that
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ̂h, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
satisfies conditions (ii)-(iv) in our equilibrium
definition, with at least one security with non-trivial payments.
Therefore, to ensure that
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ̂h, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
is a non-trivial equilibrium for E it
is sufficient to show that, for each h ∈ H the allocation zh := (xh, θ̂h, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h) is an optimal choice
in Γh(p, q, pi,N). Suppose by contradiction that for some h ∈ H there exists another allocation z˜h :=
(x˜h, θ˜h, ϕ˜h, ϕ˜α,h, ϕ˜β,h) ∈ Γh(p, q, pi,N) such that,
Uh
((
chξ (x˜
h, ϕ˜h, ϕ˜α,h)
)
ξ∈D
)
> Uh
((
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
ξ∈D
)
.
Since zh is in the interior (relative to X ) of Γh(p, q, pi,N) ∩ X h(Ω) and Uh is strictly quasi-concave,
there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that, (xhλ, θhλ, ϕhλ, ϕα,hλ , ϕβ,hλ ) := λzh + (1 − λ)z˜h ∈ Γh(p, q, pi,N) ∩ X h(Ω)
and Uh
((
chξ (x
h
λ, ϕ
h
λ, ϕ
α,h
λ )
)
ξ∈D
)
> Uh
((
chξ (x
h, ϕh, ϕα,h)
)
ξ∈D
)
, a contradiction.
Therefore
(
(p, q, pi,N), (xh, θ̂h, ϕh, ϕα,h, ϕβ,h)h∈H
)
is a non-trivial equilibrium for E . 
Proof of Proposition 1. From Arrow and Enthoven (1961), the usual Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
necessary for optimality. From the partial derivatives of agent h’s Lagrangian function with respect to xhξ
and ϕα,hξ,j we obtain,
pξCξ,j = Aξ,j(p, q, pi) +
∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)
λh(ξ)
Rµ,j(p, q, pi) +
κhξ,j + ν
h
ξ Cξ,j − ηα,hξ,j
λh(ξ)
,
where κhξ,j ≥ 0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of constraint ϕα,hξ,j + ϕβ,hξ,j ≤ ϕhξ0,j , νhξ ∈ RL+ is the vector of
multipliers associated with xhξ ≥ 0, and ηα,hξ,j ≥ 0 is the multiplier of the non-negativity constraint of ϕα,hξ,j .
From this condition, and using the partial derivative of agent h’s Lagrangian function with respect to ϕβ,hξ,j
we have,
Bξ,j(p, q, pi) = Aξ,j(p, q, pi) +
∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ)
λh(ξ)
Rµ,j(p, q, pi) +
ηβ,hξ,j + ν
h
ξ Cξ,j − ηα,hξ,j
λh(ξ)
,
where ηβ,hξ,j ≥ 0 is the multiplier of the non-negativity constraint of ϕβ,hξ,j . Thus, we obtain that,
Φhξ,j(p, q, pi) =
νhξ Cξ,j − ηα,hξ,j
λh(ξ)
+
min{ηβ,hξ,j , κhξ,j}
λh(ξ)
.
Therefore, Φhξ,j(p, q, pi) < 0 implies that η
α,h
ξ,j > 0. Thus, when Φ
h
ξ,j(p, q, pi) < 0 agent h closes short positions
on j at ξ. On the other hand, suppose that Φhξ,j(p, q, pi) > 0 and that collateral constraints of credit contract
j do not generate frictions on agent h’s optimal decisions at ξ, i.e., νhξ = 0. Then, min{ηβ,hξ,j , κhξ,j} > 0.
Hence, both ϕβ,hξ,j = 0 and ϕ
α,h
ξ,j + ϕ
β,h
ξ,j = ϕ
h
ξ0,j
, implying ϕα,hξ,j = ϕ
h
ξ0,j
. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that for some debt contract k ∈ J(ξ) conditions above hold. Suppose
that, after issuing ϕhξ0,j units of j at ξ0, j-borrower h maintains a position ϕ
α,h
ξ,j ∈ (0, ϕhξ0,j ] at node ξ.
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Therefore, h should pay Aξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
α,h
ξ,j , consume the collateral bundle Cξ,jϕ
α,h
ξ,j , and deliver a payment
Rµ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
α,h
ξ,j at each terminal node µ ∈ ξ+. It can be shown that this strategy is not optimal.
Indeed, consider the following alternative: agent h closes the short position ϕα,hξ,j and trades ϕ˜kϕ
α,h
ξ,j
units of debt contract k, where ϕ˜k =
Ψξ,j(p,q,pi)
qξ,k
. There is no additional cost at ξ, i.e., Ψξ,j(p, q, pi)ϕ
α,h
ξ,j −
qξ,kϕ˜kϕ
α,h
ξ,j = 0. Since
Cξ,k
qξ,k
≤ Cξ,j
Ψξ,j(p,q,pi)
, the original consumption bundle at ξ satisfies agent h’s new
collateral requirements. Finally, the new payments at terminal nodes imply that the Lagrangian function
increases, as
∑
µ∈ξ+
λh(µ) (Rµ,j(p, q, pi)−Rµ,k(p, q, pi)ϕ˜k)ϕα,hξ,j > 0.
Hence, any strategy that maintains open a short position on j at ξ is not optimal. 
References
[1] Alvarez, F., and U. J. Jermann (2000):“Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default,” Econo-
metrica, 68, 4, 775-797.
[2] Angeloni, L. and B. Cornet (2006): “Existence of Financial Equilibria in a Multi-Period Stochastic Economy,”
Advances in Mathematical Economics, 8, 933-955.
[3] Aouani, Z. and B. Cornet (2009): “Existence of Financial Equilibria with Restricted Participation,” Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 45, 772-786.
[4] Aouani, Z. and B. Cornet (2011): “Reduced Equivalent Form of a Financial Structure,” Journal of Mathematical
Economics, doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.015
[5] Araujo, A., Pa´scoa, M.R. (2002):“Bankruptcy in a Model of Unsecured Claims,” Economic Theory, 20, 455-481.
[6] Araujo, A., M.R. Pa´scoa, and J.P. Torres-Mart´ınez (2002):“Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete
Markets,” Econometrica, 70, 1613-1638.
[7] Araujo, A., M.R. Pa´scoa, and J.P. Torres-Mart´ınez (2005):“Bubbles, Collateral and Monetary Equilibrium,”
working paper, Department of Economics, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. Available at
http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/pdf/td513.pdf
[8] Araujo, A., M.R. Pa´scoa, and J.P. Torres-Mart´ınez (2011):“Long-lived Collateralized Assets and Bubbles,” Jour-
nal of Mathematical Economics, 47, 3, 260-271.
[9] Arrow, K., and A. Enthoven (1961):“Quasi-Concave Programming,” Econometrica, 29, 779-800.
[10] Chen, H., V. Cu´rdia, and A. Ferrero (2011):“The Macroeconomic Effects of Large-Scale Asset Purchase Pro-
grams,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report no. 527.
[11] Cornet, B., and R. Gopalan (2010): “Arbitrage and Equilibrium with Portfolio Constraints ,” Economic Theory,
doi: 10.1007/s00199-009-0506-5.
[12] Deng, Y., J.M. Quigley, and R. Van Order (2000):“Mortgage Terminations, Heterogeneity and the Exercise of
Mortgage Options,” Econometrica, vol. 68, 2, 275-307.
[13] Dubey, P., J. Geanakoplos, and M. Shubik (1989):“Default and Efficiency in a General Equilibrium Model with
Incomplete Markets,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 879R.
[14] Dubey, P., J. Geanakoplos, and M. Shubik (2005):“Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium,” Econo-
metrica, 73, 1-37.
[15] Garriga, C., and D. Schlagenhauf (2009):“Home Equity, Foreclosures, and Bailouts,” Working Paper.
[16] Geanakoplos, J., and W.R. Zame (1997):“Collateral, Default and Market Crashes,” Cowles Foundation Discussion
Paper.
26 M. A. Iraola and J. P. Torres-Mart´ınez
[17] Geanakoplos, J., and W.R. Zame (2002):“Collateral and the Enforcement of Intertemporal Contracts,” Cowles
Foundation Discussion Paper.
[18] Geanakoplos, J., and W.R. Zame (2007):“Collateralized Asset Markets,” UCLA Working Paper.
[19] Gertler, M., and P. Karadi (2012):“QE123: A Framework for Analyzing Large Scale Asset Purchases as a
Monetary Policy Tool,” Working Paper.
[20] Guvenen, F. (2009):“A Parsimonious Macroeconomic Model for Asset Pricing,” Econometrica, 2009, 77, 6,
1711-1740.
[21] Hart, O. (1975):“On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete”, Journal of
Economic Theory, 11, 418-443.
[22] Herna´ndez, A., and M. Santos (1996):“Competitive Equilibria for Infinite-Horizon Economies with Incomplete
Markets,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 102-130.
[23] Kehoe, T., and D.K. Levine (1993):“Debt Constrained Asset Markets,” Review of Economic Studies, 60, 865-888.
[24] Kocherlakota, N. (1996):“Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Committment,” Review of Economic
Studies, 63, 4, 595-609.
[25] Kubler, F., and K. Schmedders (2003): “Stationary equilibria in asset pricing models with incomplete markets,”
Econometrica 71, 1767-1793.
[26] Levine, D.K., and W.R. Zame (1996):“Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with
Incomplete Markets,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 26, 103-131.
[27] Magill, M., and M. Quinzii (1994):“Infinite Horizon Incomplete Markets,” Econometrica, vol. 62, 4, 853-880.
[28] Magill, M., and M. Quinzii (1996):“Incomplete Markets over an Infinite Horizon: Long-lived Securities and
Speculative Bubbles,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 26, 133-170.
[29] Poblete-Cazenave, R. and Torres-Mart´ınez, J.P. (2012):“Equilibrium with Limited-Recourse Collateralized
Loans,” Economic Theory, DOI:10.1007/s00199-011-0685-8.
[30] Sabarwal, T. (2003):“Competitive Equilibria with Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy,” Contribu-
tions to Theoretical Economics, 3(1).
[31] Seghir, A., and J.P.Torres-Mart´ınez (2011):“On Equilibrium Existence with Endogenous Restricted Financial
Participation,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, volume 47, issue 1, pages 37-42.
[32] Steinert, M., and J.P. Torres-Martinez (2007):“General Equilibrium in CLO Markets,” Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 43, 6, 709-734.
[33] Zame, W. (1993):“Efficiency and the Role of Default when Security Markets are Incomplete,” American Economic
Review, 83, 1142-1164.
Miguel A. Iraola
Department of Economics, University of Miami
Center for Economic Research, CIE-ITAM
E-mail address: miraola@ bus.miami.edu; miguel.iraola @ itam.mx
Juan Pablo Torres-Mart´ınez
Department of Economics, University of Chile
E-mail address: juan.torres @ fen.uchile.cl
